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This  paper outlines  an optimization framework which extends  the  fa- 
miliar Tinbergen-Theil model  in  two  ways.  First,  a  "piecewise quad- 
ratic" replaces the  standard quadratic objective  function.  Second, the 
time horizon of  the  optimization becomes,  within  the  context  of  eco- 
nomic stabilization problems, endogenous to  the  optimization process 
itself.  The purpose of  both extensions is  to  escape the  conceptual re- 
strictiveness  of  the  Tinbergen-Theil  structure  while  preserving  the 
practical convenience of that model for applied policy work. The paper 
also  describes a solution algorithm incorporating these two extensions, 
and it presents the results of a sample computational application based 
on the 1957-58 recession. 
The  goal  of  mitigating  economic  fluctuations  and  their  social  effects  has 
long  attracted  economists'  interest,  and  it  continues  to  do  so.  After  nearly 
a  decade  of  seemingly  perpetual  expansion  in  the  United  States  economy, 
the  1970  recession  has  once  more  focused  attention  on  stabilization  policy. 
How  can  policy  cope  with  the  apparently  conflicting  goals  of  high- 
employment  prosperity  and  price  stability?  How  rapidly  should  policy 
seek  to  return  the  economy  to  a  full-employment  situation?  What  timing 
patterns  should  the  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  authorities  adopt  for  their 
actions?  These  and  similar  questions  form  the  basis  of  discussions  on  the 
academic,  political,  and  popular  levels. 
The  post-WVorld War  II  economics  literature  has  developed-in  the 
work of Theil  (1964),  Tinbergen  (1966),  and others'-at  least  one  practi- 
An earlier version  of  this paper was presented at  the  Second  World  Congress of  the 
Econometric  Society,  Cambridge, England,  September  1970. I  am  grateful  for support 
from  the  Harvard  University  Society  of  Fellows  and  for  helpful  comments  from 
Martin  S.  Feldstein  and  Dale  W.  Jorgenson. 
1 For  additional  contributions,  see  Hickman  (1965)  and  Fox,  Sengupta,  and  Thor- 
becke  (1966). 
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Cal, convenient framework for planning quantitative aggregate policy  to 
cope with such fluctuations, this is the familiar dynamic optimization of 
a quadratic criterion function subject to linear equality constraints. Never- 
theless, the conceptual restrictiveness of  this framework prevents it  from 
being  widely  useful  in  actual  applications  to  policy  formulation. The 
quadratic criterion function, for example, does not  seem to  offer a  very 
good representation  of policy makers' preferences; and the necessity of an 
arbitrary choice of time horizon prevents using the framework to answer 
several significant policy  questions. 
At the same time, the more generalized mathematical programming2  and 
systems-control3  literatures have, on the whole, had too general a presenta- 
tion  to  be  of  great use  in  economic policy  applications. The  principles 
enunciated within  the  various divisions  of  optimization research are of 
great relevance and importance in  such  problems, but  the  difficulty of 
adapting these principles remains a  significant obstacle to  their applica- 
tion to economic policy problems and in particular to economic stabiliza- 
tion. Much "bridge" work remains to be done to  select that part of  the 
generality which is of sufficient  potential value to keep, as well as to render 
it readily usable in an operational and computational sense. This paper is, 
at least in part, an attempt along such lines. 
This  paper  outlines  an  optimization  framework which  extends  the 
Tinbergen-Theil  model in two ways. First, a "piecewise quadratic" replaces 
the standard quadratic criterion function. Second, the time horizon of the 
optimization becomes, within the context of  economic stabilization prob- 
lems, endogenous to  the  optimization process itself.  The  object of  both 
extensions is to escape the conceptual restrictiveness  of the Tinbergen-Theil 
structure while preserving  its practical convenience for applied policy work. 
To focus clearly on these two extensions, this paper deals with a determin- 
istic  system  in  which  the  potential  impact  of  policy  actions  on  the 
economy is known with certainty.4 
Section I discusses the piecewise quadratic criterion function. Section II 
discusses the endogenous time horizon and the associated concept of  the 
"policy  interval."  Section  III  outlines  the  solution  algorithm  for  the 
optimization and analyzes the interaction of these two extensions. Section 
2 See,  for  example,  Pontryagin  et  al.  (1962),  Fan  and  Wang  (1964),  and  Manga- 
sarian  (1969). 
3 See, for example, Sage  (1968)  and  Bryson  and Ho  (1969). 
4 Although  this  paper  does  not  discuss  the  implications  of  uncertainty,  it  is  best 
to  state  at the  outset  that  the  piecewise  quadratic  criterion  function  cannot  yield  the 
first-period  certainty  equivalence  result  which  Simon  (1956)  and  Theil  (1957)  have 
derived  for  quadratic  criteria.  Given  the  current  state  of  economic  knowledge,  how- 
ever,  the  sacrifice  of  this  property  is  not  a  major  consideration  for  applied  policy 
work, since the Simon-Theil  result requires perfect knowledge  of the  parameters which 
reflect the  impact  of  policy  instruments  on  policy  targets  (that  is,  elements  of  matrix 
R in eq.  [2]  below)  and permits uncertainty  to  enter the  problem in  a linear  fashion 
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IV  presents the  results of  a  sample computational application of  the 
algorithm. Section V briefly summarizes the optimization methods offered. 
I.  The  Piecewise  Quadratic  Criterion  Function 
A  standard form of  criterion function for optimization problems is  the 
quadratic 
W(x, y)  a'x +  b'y +--  (x'Ax +  y'By +  x'Cy +  y'C'x)  (1) 
in  which vector x  represents values of  instrument variables, subject  to 
control, vector y represents  values of target variables, related to the instru- 
ments by a set of linear constraints 
Y  Rx  +  s,  (2) 
and a, b, A, B. and C are conformable vectors and matrices of previously 
established  coefficients.5 
For expositional simplicity (involving no loss of generality), treat a and 
b as null vectors, C as a null matrix, and A and B as nonnegative diagonal 
matrices. Then for each variable xi or y?, there is  some desired value or 
zero-penalty  point xi* or yi*, and from the matrices A and B some penalty 
rate aii or biL.  The penalty attached to a given realization for any variable 
is  then  -  Xi  where xi  --  xi,  or  2  bit342,  where  Yi 
In applications to  economic policy, however, the quadratic function is 
not a very satisfactory representation of preferences likely to be pursued 
by policy makers. Exact desired values yi* and xi* for given policy targets 
or instruments in any period may not exist in these real preferences; often, 
policy makers see certain variables more as  constraints, in  the sense of 
bearing an implicit loss only for values outside some range. An even more 
unrealistic aspect of the quadratic function is the requirement that devia- 
tions of  a  target or instrument variable from its  desired value bear the 
same loss regardless  of the direction of the deviation. 
The  piecewise quadratic function offers a more general framework for 
policy optimization. Specifically, it  is  in  general asymmetrical and only 
convex (as opposed to strictly convex). In reality, it is three distinct func- 
tions, welded in  such a way as to preserve those properties of  the more 
restrictive quadratic form which are essential to the optimization process. 
The  generalization achieved by  this  function  relaxes the  principal un- 
attractive requirements associated with  the  quadratic form, and its  in- 
clusion within the framework of  the Tinbergen-Theil approach therefore 
renders that  approach more realistic and useful for examining economic 
policy problems. 
5 Equations (1)  and (2)  represent  a dynamic system in that x  and y  are stacked 
vectors, as Section III  below emphasizes.  Since this paper deals entirely with a  de- 
terministic system,  matrix  R  and  vector  s  are known  with  certainty  in  (2). ECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICY  1005 
For  each  target  variable  yi  and  instrument  variable  xi  bearing  piece- 
wise quadratic treatment, two fixed values divide the entire range of pos- 
sible values of  the  variable into  three distinct  convex sets.  The  middle 
range is a closed, bounded set of values which uniformly bear a zero loss. 
The  two extreme ranges, sets  bounded on one side  only  and not  closed 
on either side, contain values which bear nonzero losses. Two  quadratic 
functions, one defined for either extreme range, determine these losses ac- 
cording to  independent patterns, constrained so  that  the  functions ap- 
proach limiting values of zero as the variables approach the boundaries of 
the middle range; these two functions are not  defined for the boundary 
points. 
Applied, for example, to the I a x,2 terms in the sum I  x'Ax  in criterion 
function (1),  the piecewise quadratic generalization has two effects. 
First, for each instrument variable xi bearing piecewise quadratic treat- 
ment, it replaces the constant aii by the decision rule 
aiju  if  xi e U(xi)  {xi xi >  xij} 
ai 
ii 
i  i  f  Xi 
e M(xi) 
-  {xix 
<-  xi  < 
xi 
) 
(3) 
w  ajil  if  xie L(xi)  -{xixi  <  xil}, 
where 
a-i=  criterion  coefficient  applying  to  values  of  xi  in  U(xi),  the  upper 
extreme set for xi; 
aii  -  criterion  coefficient  applying  to values  of  xi in L(xi),  the lower ex- 
treme  set  for xi; 
xiu  upper boundary  point  of M(xi),  the middle  set for xi; 
Xi-  lower boundary point of M(xi). 
Second, for each such xi the piecewise quadratic generalization replaces 
the  xi  xi  xi*  relation  by  the  decision  rule 
(xi  -  XJU)  if  Xi  E U(xi) 
xi  (Xi 
x- 
Xu)  or  (xi, -  xi)  if  xi E M(xi)  (4) 
L (xi'-  xi)  if  Xi e L(xi), 
where xiu,  xi', U(xi),  M(xi),  and L(xi)  are defined as for decision rule (3). 
The option in  (4)  for x1 in the middle set is arbitrary, since aii  -  0  for 
these values. 
Decision rules (3)  and (4),  taken together, yield a piecewise quadratic 
loss function element I- ax12.  Rules specifying values for yiu, yil, b au  and 
bii yield  analogous functions  I  bj 3a2. Figure  1,  which plots  a  sample 
1  2  2  au2x  term on  the  vertical axis  against xi  on  the  horizontal axis,  il- 
lustrates the  asymmetrical (nonstrictly)  convex properties of  the  basic 
functional form.6 
6 Figure  1  shows  a  function  2  aux2  which  may  be  "typical"  in  some  sense  but ioo6  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
w(xL)I 
\  l{X-Xj)2 
II  X  xl  xu 
FIG.  1.-Prototypical  piecewise  quadratic  function 
The quadratic function is the special case of the piecewise quadratic in 
which both symmetry and strict convexity maintain. Symmetry requires 
aiju  a)il. Strict convexity requires x  = xi', that is,  the collapse of  the 
zero loss set M(xi)  to a single point. Hence, for the quadratic function, 
constant ai  - aitu  _ii1  replaces decision rule  (3)  and  constant xi* 
x8u = xil replaces decision rule (4). 
In  addition to  its  generality and flexibility, which permit a  more re- 
alistic representation of  economic policy preferences, the piecewise quad- 
ratic criterion function has  at  least  two computational advantages. One 
concerns its  interaction with  the  extension  to  the  Tinbergen-Theil ap- 
proach developed in  Section II  below;  Section  III  discusses this  inter- 
action explicitly. 
The  second computational advantage arises in  the context of  the dis- 
tinction  between equality  and  inequality  constraints. The  Theil  model 
optimizes the function (1)  subject to a set of  linear equality constraints 
(2);  this model, unlike linear programming  or general mathematical pro- 
gramming techniques, does not  admit inequality constraints. The  piece- 
wise  quadratic  function  facilitates  incorporating inequality  constraints 
while at the same time staying within the operationally convenient Theil 
framework.  This inequality constraint capability is a further aspect of the 
piecewise quadratic function's more realistic representation  of policy pref- 
erences.7 
which  does  not  utilize  the  full  flexibility  of  the  piecewise  quadratic  form.  Defining 
xix =  X  or  xil =-  o,  for  example,  specifies  a  function  which  assigns  a  loss  to  de- 
viations  of xi on one side only  of a given  value.  The  discussion below  treats the  analo- 
gous case for ai  =  ?? or aii  =  o  or both. 
7 It  is  possible  to  argue  that,  since  piecewise  quadratic  criteria  involve  more  indi- 
vidual  parameters  than  do  standard  quadratics,  the  information  required  would  be 
more  difficult to  extract  from  policy  makers.  Such  an  argument  seems  not  to  be  the 
case.  Precisely  because  the  piecewise  quadratic  function  is  capable  of  representing 
policy  preferences more  realistically,  the  required information  should  be  easier  to  ex- ECONOMIC  STABILIZATION  POLICY  I007 
.~~~~~~~~~~c 
~w  (y) 
FI.2(untos6a)ad7b 
(b  I 
yr~~~~~~~Y 
FIG.  2.-Functions  6  (a)  and  7  (b) 
Setting  ad  u  oc  imposes upon  the  optimization the  constraint xi < 
xiu; setting  ajil  -  oc  imposes the  corresponding constraint xi >  xi'.  In 
computational practice, infinite values  are not  manageable for  aiju  and 
air.  Nevertheless,  approximating  infinity  by  values  of aidu  or a,,l  larger  than 
the  other  elements  aij,  bij,  and  cij  by  several  orders  of  magnitude  is  an 
effective way  to  approximate the  relevant inequality  constraint in  the 
solution to the piecewise quadratic optimization.8 
Figures 2 and 3  show how individual piecewise quadratic terms com- 
bine to  form the piecewise quadratic function for a  given problem. For 
purposes of illustration, they treat a problem in which x and y are scalars. 
The preference function contains no term in the cross-product of x and y 
and so is separable: 
W  (X, Y)  e  W1x)  +  W2  (Y),  (5 ) 
where w1(x)  is  a  straightforward quadratic, while w2(y)  is  a  piecewise 
quadratic function: 
tract;  it  is  no  longer  necessary  to  force  preferences  to  fit  into  such  an  artificially 
limiting  framework  as  the  standard  quadratic  function. 
8 This technique is the "penalty  method"  of  nonlinear programming with  constraints 
in  Zangwill  (1969),  chap.  12.  The  basic  idea  is  to  approximate  the  feasible  region 
from the  outside. i oo8  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
w1(x)  a1x2 +  a2x +  a3,  (6) 
bu  (y  yu)2  if  YE U(y)  {yY  > yu} 
W2  (Y)  0  if  yEM(y)  {yly'  <  y  <  yu}  (7) 
_bl(yl-  y)2  if  yE  eL(y)  {yly  <  y1}. 
Figure 2 plots functions (6)  and (7).  The former is strictly convex for 
a,  >  0 and  has  a  minimum  at  x*  -  -a2j2ai,  where  w1(x*)  -  a  -  a3 
(a2) 2/4a1. The latter is convex for bu, bl >  0, having a flat zero range for 
yE M(y).  The  curves  as  drawn  imply  bl >  a,  >  bu. 
Since convexity (even when not strict) is preserved  in the addition opera- 
tion (Managasarian 1969, chap. 9), w(x,y)  in equation (5)  is itself convex. 
Using a linear relation y  Rx +  s,  for scalar R  and s, permits plotting 
equation (5)  for values of x. Three cases emerge, depending upon which 
of the three sets of values of y contains (Rx* +  s).  Figure 3 plots w(x,y) 
against x  for the three possible cases for R >  0.  In  panel  (a),  x1 <  x* 
< x2,  where x1 -  (y'  -  s)/R  and x2 -  (yu  -  s)/R;  hence,  the  minimand 
is x  x*. In panel (b),  x* <  x1, and the minimand x satisfies x* <  x < 
x1. The  opposite case is  that  of  panel  (c),  in  which x* >  x2;  here  the 
minimand  x satisfies x2 K x <  x*. 
w(x,y)  if  Rx*+  sCM(y) 
_ _ _  _  _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _  _  __I  _  __X  _ _  2 
w(x,y)  if  Rx*  +  sC  L(y) 
w(xy)  if  Rx  +  siU(y) 
I  I  Il  I 
1  Cl~  ~~I 
I  !  '~~~I  I 
__  __  _  __  _  __  L  ,  __  _  __-  __  11 
xi  X2  cae  frfc 
FIG. 3.-Three  cases for  function  5 ECONOMIC  STABILIZATION  POLICY  I009 
II.  The  Endogenous  Time  Horizon 
A major shortcoming of the Tinbergen-Theil approach to optimization is 
that "the choice of  T, the length of  the horizon, is in many cases some- 
what  arbitrary."9 Applications to  economic stabilization policy  are  ex- 
amples of such cases. A related gap in the Tinbergen-Theil approach is the 
omission of terminal conditions to apply at the close of  the optimization 
time span in period t -  T. Terminal conditions are more familiar in the 
control literature and that  of  dynamic programming  they  are difficult 
to devise and to apply in a Theil solution. A single extension of the Tin- 
bergen-Theil framework,  based on a particular conception of the optimiza- 
tion problem in a stabilization context, facilitates avoiding both of  these 
difficulties by  a  method which determines the  appropriate time  horizon 
endogenously within the optimization procedure. 
The fundamental dynamic concept of  the endogenous time horizon ap- 
proach to optimization is the "policy interval," defined as that period of 
time during which specific stabilization policy is in effect. 
This  concept rests upon the notion of  a stable economy, which in the 
short run strays  from its  "normal" path.  Given such  a  deviation,  the 
goal of the policy authorities is to return the economy to  this path while 
minimizing specified costs associated with being away from the path. The 
discussion of  zero loss  ranges in  Section  I  leads  easily  to  the  idea  of 
identifying this long-run path as a  set of  ranges of  acceptable values of 
key variables, rather than as a single set of required  point values for each 
period in time. 
The policy-interval concept also assumes the existence of some "normal" 
economic policy which pertains as long as the economy stays  within the 
acceptable bounds of the long-run path. In cases of deviation, the policy 
authorities pursue objectives associated with  returning to  this  path  by 
implementing specific stabilization policy actions-hence  the name "policy 
interval." When the economy has in  fact  returned to  the long-run path, 
the  stabilization element of  economic policy  terminates and  the  policy 
reverts to the appropriate long-run norm. 
This intuitive and descriptive definition of  the policy interval raises at 
least three questions. What determines whether the economy has deviated 
sufficiently from the long-run norm to identify  the  deviation as a policy 
interval? Once a policy interval has begun, what determines whether the 
economy has returned sufficiently to the long-run norm to end the policy 
9Theil  (1964),  p.  154. Theil  offers the  alternative  approach  of  an  infinite  horizon, 
solved  using  infinite  band  matrices  (chap.  5),  as  well  as  a  moving  horizon,  which  is 
the truncated case of  an infinite horizon  (pp.  154-61).  The  concept  of  the  endogenous 
time horizon  developed  here is more closely  related  to  Theil's  finite  horizon  base, but, 
as  the  discussion  indicates,  it  has  more  flexibility. 
10See,  for  example,  the  discussion  of  two-point  boundary  value  problems  in  Bell- 
man and Dreyfus  (1962). I0IO  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
interval? What goals do the particular stabilization policy actions within 
the policy interval pursue? 
In  response to  these  questions, these  three properties more precisely 
identify  a  given  policy  interval:  initial  conditions,  terminal conditions, 
and criterion function. These three elements of the optimization enter the 
analysis in the following manner. 
The initial conditions specify  the  conditions which the  economy must 
satisfy for a policy interval to begin. According to these initial conditions, 
the policy interval itself  begins at  that point in  time when a particular 
economic variable (or set of  variables) strays outside the given limits of 
the long-run acceptable range. Examples may be the unemployment rate 
or the rate of price increase rising too high, or the  growth rate of  real 
output falling too  low. Beginning in  the period which first satisfies the 
initial conditions for a policy  interval, the authorities undertake specific 
stabilization policy actions. 
If  the time period used in the analysis is short, or if the relevant data- 
reporting machinery entails  long  delays,  problems may  arise  with  the 
role of the initial conditions as specified above. Specifically, although the 
value of  a variable in a given period may satisfy  the appropriate initial 
conditions for a policy interval, this fact may not become apparent until 
some time later. Such cases  require a  reformulation of  the  role of  the 
initial conditions to incorporate either a forecasting procedure or a lagged 
policy response. 
The terminal conditions specify the conditions which the economy must 
satisfy for a policy interval in progress to come to an end, that is, for the 
authorities to  revert to  the long-run policy  actions which pertain in  the 
absence of  specific stabilization efforts. The  policy  interval itself  ends, 
that is, specific stabilization policy terminates, at that point in time when 
all  relevant economic variables first satisfy  the  applicable terminal con- 
ditions. That particular period marks the time horizon of the optimization 
procedure which determines the  optimal stabilization policy  during the 
policy interval." 
A necessary part of the terminal conditions is the return to acceptability 
of  the particular variable or variables which initiated the policy interval 
via the initial conditions, but  the terminal conditions may involve other 
variables as well. In a policy interval initiated by an excessive unemploy- 
ment rate, for example, typical terminal conditions may permit the policy 
interval to  end only when both  the unemployment rate and the  rate of 
price inflation are within acceptable bounds; hence, a policy which returns 
11 In  the  cases  noted  above,  for' which  delays  in  data  observation  raise  problems 
for the  interpretation  of  the  initial  conditions,  it  is  also  necessary  to  reformulate  the 
role of  the  terminal conditions  to  incorporate  either  a  forecasting  procedure  or  a  de- 
layed  end  of  the  policy  interval. ECONOMIC  STABILIZATION  POLICY  10I  I 
unemployment to its normal level, but only at the expense of  inducing a 
price inflation, is not sufficient. 
More generally formulated terminal conditions  are  also  possible.  In 
the example above of  terminal conditions based on  values of  the unem- 
ployment rate and the rate of price inflation, satisfaction of specified con- 
ditions in one period only  may  for some applications be  insufficient. In 
such cases, the terminal conditions may require values of the former vari- 
able in a given range for K  consecutive periods and values of  the latter 
in a given range for L consecutive periods, where in general K 7  L.  An 
even more general extension of the terminal conditions is the requirement 
that the specific stabilization policies undertaken during the policy interval 
not  induce particular undesirable effects after  the  policy  interval's con- 
clusion.'2 
The  criterion  function  sets  forth in  a  mathematical framework those 
economic goals which the  authorities pursue during the  policy  interval. 
These goals may be, but are not necessarily, related to long-run goals as- 
sociated with the long-run normal path of the economy. Just as it is neces- 
sary for the specific variable or variables in the initial conditions to appear 
in the terminal conditions, all variables in the terminal conditions must nec- 
essarily  appear in  the  criterion function.  The  criterion function  may, 
analogously, have additional arguments. It may be desirable, for example, 
to optimize some function of  the balance-of-payments surplus during the 
policy interval, without necessarily making such a surplus a specific con- 
straint by including it in the terminal conditions. 
As one simple illustration of  the mechanics of  the policy-interval con- 
cept and the associated endogenous time horizon optimization, assume that 
the normal long-run growth rate of  real output, dXldt,  is  sufficiently in 
excess of r to warrant identifying r as the "minimum acceptable rate" of 
growth. The initial condition for a "recessionary"  policy interval is  then 
that dXldt  falls below r. This  initial condition means that  an observed 
dXldt  <  r  calls  for  stabilization policy  actions;  for  dXldt  >  r,  policy 
maintains its  long-run course which  is  independent of  any  immediate 
stabilization needs. 
Once a policy interval has begun, it  is possible to  define a "minimum 
acceptable level" of  real output by projecting forward, at  the "minimum 
acceptable rate" r, the last observation of real output before the beginning 
of  the  policy  interval.  One possible  terminal condition  for  this  policy 
interval may then be that  real output attains or exceeds this "minimum 
desired level."'3 
12 Since  all  such  effects  of  these  policy  actions  are  easily  computable  within  the 
optimization  procedure by  using  the  R  matrix,  this  extended  form  of  terminal  condi- 
tion  is in practice not  difficult to  apply. 
13 The  exercise in  Section  IV  below  uses  a  terminal  condition  constructed  in  this IOI2  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
Figure 4  shows paths for actual and minimum desired real output as 
functions of time. Through period t -  0, real output grows at dX/dt  >  r, 
and so the minimum desired path is unnecessary. In period t -  1, how- 
ever, dX/dt  <  r, which satisfies the initial condition. The  minimum de- 
sired path is then an extrapolation at  growth rate r of  the value of  real 
output in period t  0. The  effect of  the specific stabilization policy ac- 
tions, together with the inherent long-run stability of the economy, returns 
actual output in figure 4  to a value above the minimum desired level in 
period t -  T  thereby satisfying the terminal condition. T is then the time 
horizon of the policy-interval optimization problem. 
Using the policy-interval concept in  this way makes the  time horizon 
an  endogenous, simultaneously determined element  of  the  optimization 
procedure. The  addition of  terminal conditions makes the  optimization 
problem similar in  nature to  the  two-point boundary value problem, as 
noted above. Viewed in  this  context, endogenous time-horizon optimiza- 
tion is  a  form of  two-point boundary value problem with  the  terminal 
point not fixed. 
Specifying intervals of stabilization policy in this way, as well as using 
the associated terminal condition and endogenous time-horizon techniques, 
is not a universally applicable procedure. It  is, however, suitable for the 
application of  optimization analysis  to  short-term stabilization, defined, 
as above, as the restoration of  the economy to its  "normal, long-run ac- 
ceptable" path after a deviation from that path. 
In this context, it is important to distinguish the problem of stabilizing 
the economy, during deviations from a long-run path, from the problem of 
directing the economy from one long-run  path to a different  one.'4 Methods 
designed for the  former problem may not  suffice for the latter. In  par- 
ticular, in the long-run case the time horizon chosen becomes the domi- 
nant element in the solution; and the policy interval itself emerges as an 
artificially contrived deviation from the original long-run path,15 perhaps 
unmaintainable  without an infinite time horizon to policy. 
This distinction serves to emphasize the importance of the identification 
of  the "normal, long-run acceptable" path or state  of  the economy and 
fashion;  it  is  important  to  note  that  this  terminal  condition  is  only  one  of  many 
possible  formulations. 
14 The  long-run  problem is that  of  Ramsey  (1928)  and the  subsequent  literature  of 
optimal  growth. 
15 An  example  of  the  confusion  of  stabilizing  the  economy  with  directing  it  to  a 
new long-run  path  is in  Pack  (1964).  Pack  tested  Phillips's proportional,  integral,  and 
derivative  policy  rules for their potential  ability  to  stabilize  the  1953-54,  1957-58,  and 
1960-61  recessions.  Because  he  used  a  gross  national  product  target  extrapolated  at 
3V2 percent  from  the  peak  of  the  1953  recession,  the  actual  1960-61  experience  was 
far  enough  from  the  target  to  render  stabilization  policy  as  such  inadequate  in  his 
tests. His  1960-61  experiments in  fact  aimed to  move  the  economy  to  a long-run  path 
which  it  had  left  nearly  a  decade  earlier,  not  to  stabilize  a  specific  short-term  de- 
viation.  For  this  reason,  his  1960-61  experiments  failed  to  produce  the  interesting 
results which  his  1953-54  and  1957-58  experiments  showed. ECONOMIC  STABILIZATION  POLICY  IOI3 
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FIG.  4.-Recessionary  policy  interval  based  on  variable  X 
the long-run policy which accompanies it. Such a path must be maintain- 
able on an effectively permanent basis, that is, for the foreseeable future. 
Only  in  this  context  of  short-run deviations  about  a  self-maintaining'6 
long-run path  does  the  policy-interval concept provide a  workable ap- 
proach to  the  formulation of  stabilization policy.  The  techniques devel- 
oped here, therefore, are suitable not for general application but only  for 
a more restricted set of  situations requiring the mitigation of  short-term 
fluctuations.'7 
III.  The  Solution  Algorithm 
The  algorithm that  includes both  the  piecewise quadratic and  the  en- 
dogenous time-horizon extensions to the dynamic optimization model has 
a three-tiered structure which relies upon the technique, familiar in math- 
ematical programming,  of  solving a  complicated problem by  breaking it 
down into  a  series of  simpler problems. Level  I  is  the  classical Theil 
optimization with  neither  extension.  Level  II,  which  operates  through 
16 The  long-run  normal  path,  discussed  in  relation  to  the  policy-interval  concept, 
is self-maintaining  in  two  senses. First,  a long-run  policy  exists  to  move  the  economy 
along  this  path.  Second, the  inherent  stability  of  the  economy  can  contribute  to  cor- 
recting, in  time, such  deviations  from the  long-run  path  as do  occur. The  implied  role 
for stabilization  policy  within  a policy  interval  is, therefore, to  correct these deviations 
more quickly  and  with  less loss  as  measured  by  the  given  preference  function. 
17 Without  holding  categorically  that  the  policy-interval  approach  is  unsuitable  for 
longer-run  optimal  growth  exercises  in  the  Ramsey  tradition,  one  may  argue  that 
applying  the  approach  developed  here  to  such  problems  raises  difficulties  which  the 
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repeated solution of  Level I  problems in an iterative procedure, imposes 
upon the optimization the piecewise quadratic criterion function but uses 
an arbitrarily fixed time horizon. Level  III,  which operates through re- 
peated solution of Level II problems in a similar iterative procedure,  makes 
the time horizon endogenous and thereby completes the optimization. 
The Level I problem, worked out in a readily computed form by Theil 
(1964, chap. 2),  takes the following form: 
Substituting (2)  into  (1)  yields 
W(x)  ko +  k'x +  -x'Kx,  (8) 
2 
where 
-o =  b's +  -s'Bs, 
2 
k-a  +  R'b +  (C +  R'B)s,  (9) 
K  A +  R'BR +  CR +  R'C'. 
Minimizing W(x)  with respect to x yields the optimal solution 
x  Kk  (10) 
This  solution ratifies the first-order condition 
dW(x)  (11) 
dx 
The necessity that  K  be nonsingular, an important point below, follows 
from the second-order  minimum condition that K be positive definite. The 
optimal y follows from substituting x into (2).  Hence, the Level I problem 
yields an optimal solution (,9y) and associated'8 optimal x and y. 
It  is important to note  the dimensions of  the vectors and matrices in 
this solution. The vector x  is a stacked vector;  hence, for the case of  m 
instrument variables, the vector x has mT elements, where T is  the fixed 
time horizon for the Level I  problem. Similarly, for the case of  n  target 
variables, vectors y and s have mT elements. All other vectors and ma- 
trices are conformable. 
The Level II problem solves a series of Level I problems, each with dif- 
ferent A and/or B matrices and a different s vector. 
On the first subiteration,19  the diagonal elements aii assume, for those xi 
18  In Theil's standard quadratic case, the optimal x  and y  follow  from the  definitions 
x =  x -  x*  and  y -  y  -  y*.  For  a  piecewise  quadratic  criterion  function  with  non- 
trivial zero loss sets, the optimal  Z follow  from decision rule  (4),  and similarly  for  the 
optimal 'Y. 
19 The  repeated solutions  of  the  Level  I  problem  within  a  given  Level  II  problem 
are  called  "subiterations";  "iterations"  are  the  repeated  solutions  of  the  Level  II 
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which have piecewise quadratic treatment, either the a..u or the ail values; 
any number of arbitrary decision rules may suffice. The xi*, to be used in 
calculating x  -  xi-*  on  this  subiteration, assume the  values  xqu to 
correspond to aiiu or xi to  correspond to aiiI. For those xi which do not 
bear piecewise quadratic treatment, the  aii and xi*  values  are straight- 
forward. 
The  bii and yi*  values for the first subiteration follow from the same 
arbitrary  decision rule; and the yi* and xi* vectors, together with the other 
information necessary for  the  Level  I  problem, suffice to  derive the  s 
vector 20  for the first subiteration. Using these A  and B matrices and this 
s vector, the algorithm solves the Level I problem, yielding a set of optimal 
xi and Yi. 
For any subiteration other than the first, the algorithm adjusts the (aij, 
X*)  and the (bi,  yi*)  according to decision rules (3)  and  (4),  using the 
set  of  optimal  (xi,  9i)  from the  previous subiteration. Having  applied 
these decision rules, the  algorithm uses  the  adjusted A  and B  matrices 
and the  adjusted  s vector  to resolve  the Level  I problem. 
The Level II problem terminates on the first subiteration for which de- 
cision rules (3)  and  (4)  call for no adjustment to be made in any  (a*,, 
xi*)  or  (bie, yi*).  Any  further subiterations would simply reproduce the 
final solution. 
The Level III  problem solves a series of Level II problems, each with a 
different  trial  time  horizon. 
On the  first iteration, the  trial  time horizon T  is  arbitrary. The  al- 
gorithm then solves the Level II  problem for fixed time horizon T. After 
solving the Level II problem, the algorithm checks the optimal (x, y)  for 
satisfaction of the terminal conditions. There are three possibilities: 
If  (xy  )  first satisfies the terminal conditions in  T -  T  the Level III 
problem terminates. This  (x, y, T)  is the final solution for the policy in- 
terval. 
If  (x, y)  first satisfies the terminal conditions in T <  T, the algorithm 
resets T -  T for the next iteration and again solves the Level II problem. 
If  (x, y)  fails to satisfy the terminal conditions in any period up to and 
including T,  the algorithm resets T -T  +  1 for the next iteration and 
again solves the Level II  problem. 
At  this point,  several observations are in  order about the  interaction 
among the three levels of the algorithm: 
First, a qualification to the flexibility of the piecewise quadratic criterion 
function arises as  a  "nonredundancy" restriction on  the  number of  the 
20 The  s vector  varies  from  one  subiteration  to  the  next,  because  it  effectively  nor- 
malizes  constraints  (2)  about  the  particular  xi  or  x u  being  used  for  xi*  and  the 
particular yil  or yiu being  used  for  yi*.  To  be  explicit,  the  algorithm  involves  rewrit- 
ing  constraints  (2)  as  -  R=  '  Rx+'  and  using  this  "s" for  s.  Since 'x and  y  vary  (for 
given x  and y)  according to  decision  rules  (4),  this  G"s  varies also. ioi6  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
xi and yi which can simultaneously bear the full piecewise quadratic treat- 
ment. Any number may have asymmetrical terms with aiu 74 aii' or biju  74 
biji  so  this  restriction applies only  to  those  terms with  nontrivial sets 
M(x;)  or M(y;),  that is, with xi"  74 xi' or yiU 74 ybl. The source of this re- 
striction is the requirement  that matrix K, as defined in (9),  be nonsingular 
for the solution of the Level I problem in  (10).  If  a sufficient number of 
xi and ye bear piecewise quadratic treatment with nontrivial M(xi)  and 
M(yi),  and if  a particular relationship among these variables maintains 
via equation (2),  then, in the event that certain xi fall in M(xi)  and cer- 
tain y, fall in M(yi)  simultaneously, matrix K will have one or more rows 
and columns consisting of zero vectors. More specifically, each column of 
matrix K corresponds  to one xi, the value of a particular instrument vari- 
able in a particular time period. If the optimal xi falls in M(xi),  then that 
xi  depends only upon the effect of movements in xi on the target variables 
in the problem. If, in addition, however, all y, affected by xi via equation 
(2)  fall  in  their respective M (vy),  then  the  K  matrix will  apply only 
zero elements to values of xi. Hence, the value of Xi under such circum- 
stances is indeterminate, as illustrated operationally by the singularity of 
K.  The  nonsingularity or  "nonredundancy" restriction in  the  Level  II 
problem is a prohibition barring any pattern of piecewise quadratic terms 
which could yield such a result in an associated Level I problem.2' 
A second restriction is that any variable which is a part of the terminal 
conditions in  the  Level  III  problem must  be  treated in  the  piecewise 
quadratic mode in the Level II problem. Suppose, for example, that in the 
example of  Section II,  the only  terminal condition is  the  restoration of 
real output  to  the  minimum desired level.  In  the  absence of  piecewise 
quadratic treatment, those  elements yi*  which correspond to  successive 
periods' values of real output assume, as fixed values, the successive mini- 
mum desired levels. Then a problem arises in  that  the  Level I  problem 
penalizes not only values of real income below the minimum desired level, 
but any value above this level as well;  this effect retards satisfaction of 
the terminal condition, with distorting effects for the Level III  problem. 
In general, piecewise quadratic treatment of the terminal-condition  values 
is necessary to  provide a  zero-penalty region on  the appropriate side of 
the relevant (xi*, yi*).  Hence, piecewise quadratic optimization, although 
it  is  an  entirely independent generalization of  the  Tinbergen-Theil ap- 
proach, is  a  necessary precursor to  the  application of  endogenous time 
horizon optimization to economic stabilization policy. 
A third major problem, left  unanswered in the exposition of  the Level 
21 In  practice,  this  restriction  does  not  seem  cumbersome.  Any  piecewise  quadratic 
function  which  sets  xi  * -  xiu =  xil  for  all  xi  satisfies  the  restriction  regardless of  the 
presence  of  nontrivial  M(yi).  In  cases  for  which  a  nontrivial  M(xi)  is  essential  for 
one  or  more  xi,  reference  to  the  R  matrix  indicates  the  implied  restrictions  for  the 
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III  problem above, is the possibility that the optimal (x, y)  may satisfy 
the terminal  conditions for no reasonable  value of T.22 A terminal condition 
involving 2 percent unemployment and zero price inflation, for example, 
is unlikely to be satisfied in the context of any  reasonable model of  the 
economy. It  is  this  problem which effectively restricts the  applicability 
of the policy interval concept and the associated algorithm to short-term 
stabilization policy, as the discussion of Section II  indicates. 
IV.  A  Computational  Example 
The  1957-58 recession in the United States may serve as a good example 
of a policy interval to illustrate the application of the methods developed 
above. The model of the economy used is the Wharton model (Evans and 
Klein 1968), linearized so as to reflect the behavior of the economy in the 
1957-58 period.23 
The 1957-58 recession has been, to date, the most severe in the postwar 
period. Real output fell from a peak of $455.2 billion24  in 1957:III  (third 
quarter of 1957) to $437.5 billion in 1958:1, for a decline of nearly 4 per- 
cent. Not until 1958:IV did real output regain its prerecession  peak value. 
At the same time, the total unemployment rate rose from 4.0 percent in 
1957:I  to  over  7.4  percent, the  highest  value  observed in  the  postwar 
period, in  1958:III.  To  date  1958:II  and  1958:III  have been the  only 
quarters  in the postwar period to register a total unemployment rate above 
7 percent. 
In the terminology of Section II,  the 1957-58 experience constitutes an 
easily  recognizable recessionary policy  interval. Nevertheless, it  is  diffi- 
cult, especially in the context of the purely expository aim of this section, 
to  arrive at  clearly satisfactory initial  and  terminal conditions for  this 
policy interval. The unemployment rate first began to rise in 1957:1I, but 
the increase was not pronounced  until 1957:  IV, and the unemployment rate 
did not go above 5 percent until 1958:I. Real output reached  a clear peak in 
1957:111, but this peak represented  a growth of less than 2 percent at an 
annual rate since the previous quarter, and the level of  real output was 
lower in 1957:1I than in 1957:1. Hence, in the absence of a clear definition 
of the policy of the period-as  seems always the case in historical exercises 
-no  straightforward  initial condition for the policy interval is obvious.25 
22 This  point  concerns the  convergence  properties  of  the  Level  III  problem.  For  a 
discussion  of  these  convergence  properties,  as  well  as  those  of  the  Level  II  problem, 
see Friedman  (1971),  chaps. 6 and  7. 
23 The  motivation  and  technique  of  the  linearization  are  discussed  in  Friedman 
(1971),  chaps. 2 and 3. 
24 Values for output  and  government  purchases, stated  in  this  section,  are seasonally 
adjusted  quarterly  values  at  annual  rates.  Price  and  unemployment  values  are  also 
seasonally  adjusted. Data  are from Survey  of  Current Business;  The National  Income 
and Product  Accounts  of  the  United  States,  1929-1965;  and Federal  Reserve  Bulletin. 
25 The  discussion  in  Section  II  of  the  function  of  initial  conditions  in  the  policy- ioi8  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
TAB LE  1 
NONCONSTANT  X-X AND  y*  VALUES 
G  X 
QUARTER  Gt1  Gt  it  Xt  Xti 
1957:III  ...................  84.1  89.1  456.6  466.6 
1957:  IV  ....................  84.9  89.9  459.9  470.1 
1958:I  .....................  86.8  91.8  463.4  473.6 
1958:  II  ....................  88.6  93.6  466.8  477.1 
1958:  III  ....................  89.8  94.8  470.3  480.6 
1958:IV  ....................  91.5  96.5  473.7  484.2 
NOTE.-G  =  federal government purchases, $1958 billion;  X  -  gross output, $1958 billion. 
A  compromise solution to  this problem is  to  select real output as  the 
primary indicator of  a recessionary policy interval. A  subjective view of 
the historical period suggests 1957:111 as an arbitrary initial quarter of 
the  policy  interval, and  a  terminal condition which  requires that  real 
output (X)  equal or exceed its  minimum acceptable level, specified as a 
3  percent per annum projection of  the  level  of  real output in  1957:JI. 
Table 1 shows the quarterly values of this path. 
The criterion function assigns a loss to any value of real output below 
the relevant minimum acceptable level. There is no reason to assign losses 
to all values above this level, however, and so it is necessary to treat real 
output in a  piecewise quadratic function. Hence, table  1 labels the pro- 
jection from the observed $453.2 billion in  1957:1I as Xt', because these 
values divide the sets L(Xt)  and M(Xt). 
Choosing the corresponding  Xt(,  to divide the sets M(Xt)  and U(Xt), 
is  an entirely arbitrary matter. Table  1 shows Xt"' values which are a 
projection, at the same 3 percent annual rate used for the Xt1, from a base 
level $10 billion above the actual value of  real output in  1957:11. Since 
the  sample exercise presented here treats a  recessionary policy  interval, 
the Xt" values would be relevant only in the case of extreme overshooting. 
This situation does not in fact arise, so the Xt" values are largely super- 
fluous; the sets M(Xt)  could just as well be unbounded above. 
To summarize,  the policy interval in this exercise begins in 1957:III and 
terminates when the optimal value of real output Xt in any period satisfies 
Xt e M(Xt)  {XtIXt' <  Xt <  Xtu}.  The  exercise focuses on  five  vari- 
ables: three target variables-real  output, the gross national product price 
deflator, and the total unemployment rate; and two instrument variables 
-total  government purchases and the central bank discount rate.26  Table 
interval  approach suggests both  the  difficulty  and  thie nonnecessity  of  specifying  such 
conditions  precisely  in  historical  exercises. 
26  It  is  possible  to  argue  that  the  central  bank  discount  rate  is  not  an  exogenous 
tool  of  monetary  policy  but,  rather,  an  endogenous  variable  which  follows  market 
rates. Even  under this view,  there remain two  related rationales  for  using the  discount ECONOMIC  STABILIZATION  POLICY  10I9 
TABLE  2 
ACTUAL  X  AND  Y  VALUES 
Quarter  G  ID  X  P  UN 
1957:III  ................  89.1  3.19  455.2  0.980  4.20 
1957:IV  ................  89.9  3.25  448.2  0.985  4.97 
1958:1  ..................  91.8  2.68  437.5  0.993  6.27 
1958:  II  .................  93.6  1.84  439.5  0.997  7.30 
1958:III  ................  94.8  1.80  450.7  1.001  7.43 
1958:IV  ................  96.5  2.29  461.6  1.006  6.43 
NOTE.-G  =federal  government  purchases,  $1958  billion;  ID  -  discount  rate,  percentage;  X  = 
gross output,  $1958  billion;  P =  GNP  price deflator index,  1958 =  1.00;  UN =  total  unemployment 
rate,  percentage. 
2 actually observed values of these variables. The description of the policy 
interval itself outlines the treatment of  real output in  this exercise. The 
treatment of the other four variables is as follows. 
The  desired  path  for  the  price  deflator  for  gross  national  product  (P) 
is a constant vector with each element equal to 0.971, the actual level in 
195  7:II. 
The  desired path  for unemployment (UN)  is  a  constant 4.0  percent 
level. 
The  government  purchases  of  goods  and  services  variable  (G)  bears 
piecewise quadratic treatment. The  actual values, given in  table 2, form 
the Gtu path.27 The Gt' path is a set of values, each of which is lower than 
the corresponding  actual, or Gt", value by  $5 billion. Table  1 shows the 
Gt1  and Gtu  paths. 
The  central  bank  discount  rate  (ID)  also  bears  piecewise  quadratic 
treatment, with IDt*  IDth -  IDt1 constant at 3.0 percent. Hence,  the 
zero loss ranges M(IDt)  exist only trivially as points. The piecewise quad- 
ratic treatment arises in the differential criterion function weighting pat- 
tern for sets  L(IDt)  and  U(ID&). 
The criterion function in this exercise assigns loss values only to squared 
deviations of the target and instrument variables and not to cross-products 
of  deviations;  that  is,  the  criterion function  vectors a  and  b  are null 
vectors, matrices A  and B are diagonal matrices, and matrix C is a null 
matrix, as in the simplified exposition of Section I. The weighting patterns 
for all five variables are as follows.28 
rate as an instrument  variable.  First,  even  though  it  follows  market  rates, it  bears  an 
announcement  effect  which  influences expectations  by  confirming  Federal  Reserve  ap- 
proval  of  financial market  trends and  intentions  of  maintaining  them.  Second,  it  may 
at times serve as a more general proxy  for shifting  monetary  policy  stances  which  are 
otherwise  difficult to  quantify. 
27 Any  such  use  of  actual  values  implies  some  assumption  that  expenditure  policy 
at  the  time  corresponded  to  social  needs  evaluated  independently  of  any  need  for 
antirecessionary fiscal policy. 
-2  This  paper  presents  no  arguments  to  defend  the  particular  criterion  function I020  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
TABLE  3 
OPTIMAL  X  AND  Y  VALUES 
Quarter  G  ID  X  P  UN 
1957:111 ...............  89.7  2.95  456.5  0.980  3.99 
1957:IV  ...............  95.4  2.98  459.8  0.986  3.10 
1958:1  .................  102.8  2.99  463.1  0.996  2.22 
1958:11  ................  104.0  3.00  466.6  1.002  3.18 
1958:111  ...............  101.9  3.00  470.2  1.007  4.72 
1958:IV  ...............  102.1  3.00  475.0  1.012  4.81 
NOTE.--See note to  table 2 for explanation of  terms. 
The piecewise quadratic weights for X  assign bjjl  50 for Xt  f  L(Xt) 
and  bj"  -  5  for Xt e U(Xt),  reflecting the  priority of  the  recessionary 
policy  interval.  The  quadratic weight29 for  P  is  ba-  3.0 X  106. The 
quadratic weight for UN is bit  25. The piecewise quadratic weights for 
G assign aiil -  1.5 for Gt e L(Gt)  and aiu  1 for Gt eU(Gt).  The piece- 
wise quadratic weights for ID  assign air'  200 for IDt e L(IDt),  reflecting 
the effective imposition of the constraint ID  >  3.0, and aciu  20 for IDt 
U(IDt). 
The algorithm converges to T-  6 regardless  of the initial arbitrary T. 
On the  final iteration, three subiterations are required for the piecewise 
quadratic convergence. The  criterion function, evaluated for the actually 
observed x  and y over the interval, has value 5.34 X  104; evaluated for 
the optimal x  and 9 over the  interval, its  value is  9.83 X  102. Table  3 
shows the optimal x and y. 
It is clear from a comparison of tables 2 and 3 that the main effect of 
the optimization is to raise government  purchases and, in so doing, to raise 
real output. The  optimal ?t  are consistently  above the  actual  Xt;  the 
difference exceeds $25 billion in  1958:I,  the trough quarter of  the actual 
AA 
recession. In 1958:IV, Xt >  Xtf to yield time horizon T -  6 for the policy 
interval. 
The increase in X in the optimal solution is possible only at the cost of 
additional price inflation, however, and the optimal Pt are somewhat above 
the actual Pt, with the difference  growing to 0.006 by the end of the policy 
interval. The narrowness  of this margin indicates the unresponsiveness  of 
prices in  the  Wharton model. The  performance of  the  optimal  UNt  is 
superior to that of the actual UNt. 
The force moving the economy from the historical base to the optimal 
path is fiscal policy, operating through massive government purchases. The 
weights  chosen, and none is intended.  The  object  of  this exercise is simply  to  illustrate 
the  operation  of  the  piecewise  quadratic  and  endogenous  time-horizon  optimization 
methods. 
29 Because of  the  different units  of  measurement  of  the  various  x  and  y,  the  a  and 
b  values  may  be  deceptive;  bii =  3.0 X  106  for  the  price  index  does  not  represent  a 
very  large weight. ECONOMIC  STABILIZATION  POLICY  102  I 
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optimal Gt are greater than the actual Gt by more than $10 billion in the 
two quarters of and immediately following the trough of the actual reces- 
sion. The large a'il placed on  the discount rate effectively prevents that 
variable from falling significantly below its IDt1 boundary, thereby provid- 
ing a good example of the use of the piecewise quadratic criterion function 
to impose an inequality constraint on the optimization. 
V.  Summary 
The piecewise quadratic criterion function generalizes the standard quad- 
ratic so as to facilitate a much more reasonable representation  of economic 
policy  preferences;  its  asymmetrical  property  also  provides  a  ready 
method for imposing inequality constraints upon the optimization. Endo- 
genous time-horizon optimization averts the arbitrariness  of  the selection 
of the time horizon in previous optimization methods, thereby permitting 
the  optimization to  deal  with  questions involving the  desired speed of 
economic recovery; it  also facilitates dealing with terminal conditions in 
the sense of dynamic programming.  These two methods are independent in 
motivation but not in operation, in that the solution algorithm presented 
makes the piecewise quadratic criterion function a necessary precursor to 
endogenous time-horizon optimization. The  combined effect of  these two 
extensions to the Tinbergen-Theil model is to provide a framework  which 
is  not  only  sufficiently broad and  flexible to  treat  many  of  the  basic 
problems of  formulating quantitative economic stabilization policy,  but 
is  also sufficiently straightforward in  its  operational and  computational 
aspects to render  such a treatment easily accessible for applied policy work. 
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